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The guarantee of secure and authentic future access to any digital data is a big worry to 
those who work with data now and those who are responsible to keep it accessible for 
the future. There are a wide range of threats to digital data that these people should need 
to take into consideration. The project PreservIA had the goal to assess the risks of 
using analogue 35mm film to store and preserve digital information and define its 
strengths and weaknesses for long-term secure preservation of all kinds of digital data. 
The research project was examining the application of the Piql technology to ensure the 
security, integrity and authenticity of the information stored on a unique storage 
medium. PiqlFilm has been designed for a life span of 500 years or more and the 
research tries to assess how well this solution could maintain the authenticity and 
availability of the information, independently of internal and external changes in the 
surrounding environment over time.
The research project has been designed using a scenario-based approach and the 
morphological method of scenario development is used to define a set of scenarios 
covering the risks to the service.
The scenario classes used were accident, technical error, natural disaster, crime, 
sabotage, espionage, terrorism, armed conflict and nuclear war. A scenario template has 
been included for the purpose of describing current and future scenarios. The final 
scenario analysis identified potential vulnerabilities. 
The paper shows briefly how Piql Preservation Services holistic preservation approach 
perform the work, defines a methodology to select the scenarios for the assessment and 
then studies the vulnerabilities and security challenges of the solution on those 
scenarios. The project also includes a comparison of other existing storage media to 
evaluate their robustness to the addressed scenarios in relation to Piql technology.
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Introduction
Digital Preservation is a set of processes and tasks to ensure the access and use in the 
future of any kind of digital assets created now or in the past (Termens, 2013). We could 
consider long term from different business perspectives but 25, 50, 100 years or even 
more is a very realistic need for the conservation of digital data (Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences (2007).
There are many challenges when long term preservation is on the table, and they can 
be separated into two main areas: physical preservation and logical preservation. The 
first refers to reliability, affordability, sustainability and efficiency of the physical media 
used to archive data (storage media). The physical and chemical stability of the 
recordable medium where data is stored is the core of the problem of long-term digital 
archiving (Plata and Bjerkestrand, 2012; Spitz Hourcade and LaloG, 2010).
The second, logical preservation, refers to three aspects that must be covered and 
solved: the ability to recover the bit stream from the physical media regardless of its 
degradation or hardware obsolescence; the ability to understand and use the digital data 
despite changes in data formats or software applications that interpret and render the 
data; and finally, the ability to describe the data to ensure its integrity and authenticity. 
The OAIS model (CCSDS, 2002) was created years ago to address this challenge 
and ensure the availability of the digital data with identical properties and content as the 
ones who made it originally. One of the prerequisites has been a need for a continuous 
migration process that involves not only the data but all the information that describes 
it. 
Data migration is now the most frequently used preservation technique and it is 
based on copying the data and information unlimited number of times from one medium 
to a new generation medium and from one file format to another. The main risk of this 
strategy is the danger of data alteration during the process that could lead to inaccuracy, 
incompleteness or a lack of integrity of the original data to be preserved. An additional 
issue is the continuous need for funds to achieve preservation goals, as periodic tasks 
must be performed. This technique serves the two areas, physical and logical. 
An alternative approach has become emulation. It is based on the data preservation 
on the original media, providing tools to avoid the hardware/software obsolescence. 
With this tool, the old systems could work on new hardware and the user experience 
would be the same as that of the old hardware. As this technique is mostly focused on 
the logical area, the existence of a long term stable storage medium would be very 
helpful.
Finally, a third option emerges as an alternative to migration or emulation: the use of 
open technologies and standards to mitigate the impact of technology obsolescence. 
Open technology is the best to be preserved, as full description of formats and code are 
available and can be archived with the data.1 
In this context, Piql has worked on different projects (Piql, 2015) in consortium with 
main technology leaders of different industries to develop a reliable, secure and cost 
effective long-term preservation solution that was first presented to the market in 2014. 
Additionally, and included in its continuous improvement vision, Piql launched the 
PreservIA project together with Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) to 
1 See the Storage Networking Industry Association (SNIA): http://www.snia.org 
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improve the technology based on piqlFilm, a 35mm nano-film, to ensure the security, 
immunity and authenticity of the digital data stored on it. 
The work presented in this paper was focused on performing a risk assessment of 
the Piql services, to identify its potential vulnerabilities and security challenges and let 
Piql solve or decrease them, allowing the users of Piql services to save resources and to 
avoid the risks of a migration scenario. As a side product of this project, FFI 
(Norwegian Defence Research Establishment) has developed a whole assessment guide 
that could help the users of preservation services to verify its own security issues and 
solve them in a structured manner. 
Identified risks will be analysed according to their effect on the confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of the preserved information. As the time frame for this 
assessment is 500 years, it is simply impossible from a scientific point of view to 
predict what changes our world will go through in that time. We have therefore dealt 
with trends and events we can perceive today. Note that the term ‘risk’ (rather than 
‘threat’) includes both intentional acts and unintentional events. 
Preservation Services 
The Piql Preservation System is a complete end-to-end approach for ultra-secure data 
storage and long-term preservation of digital data, that ensures data’s authenticity, 
immunity and security for a timespan of more than 500 years (Piql, 2015). 
The system includes different components that are shown on the Figure 1 as well as 
software tools in compliance with the OAIS model. 
Figure 1. Piql system.
The services provided by this system reach the market through selected Piql partners 
located around the world. Every such partner delivers these services to multiple data- 
owners in need of either ultra-secure data storage or long-term digital preservation 
across sectors and industries.
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To gain a proper understanding of the Piql services, it is useful to go through the 
service journey (Figure 2) step by step to understand how digital information ends up on 
a piqlFilm in a secured storage facility. 
Figure 2. Writing and reading workflows.
1. The service journey starts with born-digital or digitized data being sent to Piql 
by a data owner. This delivery can be done online or through offline transfer 
with secure methods.
2. When received, integrity checks are performed to make sure that the data was 
not altered during the reception, and that no viruses are transferred into the Piql 
system. The received data then goes through a preparation process with two 
purposes:
a) to collect relevant metadata to enable future access to the data and to encode 
both the data and metadata into the Piql system storage format, comprising a 
single file; 
b) to provide the data owner with three choices: digital, visual or hybrid 
preservation of the data. 
3. The data is then sent to the piqlWriter where it goes through yet another integrity 
check before being written to the piqlFilm. The piqlFilm is manually loaded into 
the piqlWriter by an operator who does not access the computer and thus the 
original file.
4. Once written, the piqlFilm is sent to processing. The content is then verified 
with the piqlReader.
5. Once verified, the original data is deleted from the computer system, and the 
piqlFilm is transported to a secure offline storage facility.
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Reading Procedure 
1. Metadata from each individual piqlFilm is stored in an online database, where 
the data owner can search for any specific file and request retrieval. 
2. Upon request through the online client interface, the piqlFilm is sent for retrieval 
using open-source reading technology, 
3. The retrieved data can be delivered to the data owner either electronically 
(through a client interface, an integrated digital management system or a file 
transfer service) or in a physical form (e.g. hard drive). 
The information stored on piqlFilm is self-contained. This means that regardless of 
available software or technology in the future, the data can always be retrieved. 
Instructions on how to retrieve the data is written in human readable text at both the 
beginning and the end of every reel of piqlFilm. If the data is written in visual format, 
all you need, in theory, is a light source and a magnifying lens and you will be able to 
read it immediately. If the data is written in digital form, you also need a camera (a 
capturing device) and a computer (to decode the digital frames). Instructions on how to 
decode the frames back to readable files is included in the retrieval information 
mentioned earlier. Software to interpret and render digital data is written on the film to 
ensure the use in the future, if open technologies are used. When proprietary tools are 
mandatory, all the available information is written on the piqlFilm to ease future users in 
their interpretation, but when possible the use of public formats, standards or open 
source software is recommended.
Scope of Project Report 
Risk assessments are a method to better manage risks; to be made aware of the threats 
and vulnerabilities towards our objectives makes it possible to put appropriate security 
measures in place. Moreover, the security parameters surrounding the storage site can 
also be recommended to end users. Value-oriented thinking is essential to this risk 
assessment and understanding the relationship between value, threat and vulnerability. 
To implement appropriate security measures, it is necessary to be aware of the multitude 
of assets that will require protection, i.e. the type of information and the corresponding 
sensitivity of that information.
This could vary greatly: for instance, military graded information is a lot more 
sensitive than a company’s accounting records. The security level surrounding the 
preservation services would vary in equal measure. The intrinsic value of the assets will 
suggest what kind of threats they face and thus what their vulnerabilities are. 
This risk assessment consists of three stages:
1. Risk identification:
a) mapping the object of analysis (the Preservation Services)
b) finding and describing corresponding risks
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2. Risk analysis:
a) finding which intentional or unintentional threats/hazards are relevant to the 
different value-levels of the assets written on the media
b) the vulnerability of this value against said threat/hazard
3. Risk evaluation:
a) determining the level of risk
b) identifying security measures to reduce the harmful effect on the 
Preservation Services.
The processes or objects of study included in this assessment are:
1. The production phase
2. The storage phase
3. The structures surrounding and connecting these objects
a) transportation between production site and storage facility
b) the operational processes of running the automated storage facility.
Scenario Definitions
Due to the scale of the object of analysis – the Piql Preservation Services, with all three 
components (film, box and vault) and the complexity of the service journey – it became 
apparent that a simplification of the subject matter was required to enable an adequate 
scenario development process, which in turn would lead to a meaningful scenario 
analysis relevant to this study. Accordingly, we were obliged to make certain 
standardised assumptions about the present and future application of the Preservation 
Services for this assessment.
We made clearly defined classifications for the categories geography, time-frame 
and user class, described in the next points.
Geography
Piql Services is a global organisation, and to divide the geography into more 
manageable groupings, the three geographical zones operated within this assessment are 
North, Middle and South. This division is based on the following classifications: 
climate, development level and political stability. Climate was chosen as the main 
classifier, as it is deemed to be the most stable indicator over time, even considering 
climate change. Together these three indicators give an adequate description of the 
characteristics of a country.
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Time Periods
With a longevity of 500 years, if not more, of the components of the Preservation 
Services, the time perspective of the risk assessment in this project is a lot longer than 
normal. In fact, it is too long to be relatable. Consequently, we have created two time 
periods to use in the scenario development: one short-term and one long-term. The 
classification is again based on the users’ needs, in this case how long we imagine a user 
would have need of the information which is stored. It was natural, then, to set the 
short-term period from 0 to 30-50 years. This is the length of a person’s career, and thus 
signifies the amount of time they can imagine needing access to information. We 
presuppose that the same goes for a business, as things will have evolved and changed 
quite a bit during this time, perhaps to the point of making the information obsolete. 
Any need to store information beyond this short-term period we presuppose is for the 
preservation of the information for future generations. For instance, there is the need to 
preserve the cultural and historical heritage of a society, or the need to preserve original 
data for future research with new methods and ways of thinking. This long-term period 
is set from 50 to 500 years. 
User Class and Asset 
As our working-perspective in the report is user-oriented, the user group classification 
needs to be as accurate as possible, yet it is one of the most challenging ones to define. 
The Preservation Services are available to any entity in any sector or industry in the 
world in possession of critical data requiring archiving and long-term preservation. This 
includes enterprises or bodies functioning in modern society, both private and public. 
Attempting to make a complete list of all these entities is near impossible. For the 
purposes of this report, the levels of sensitivity are divided into five groupings, outlined 
in table below. 
Table 1. Levels of sensitivity.
Category Description
Public highly sensitive Classified or confidential information, as specified by national acts 
on protective security services (The Security Act, 1998).
Public sensitive I Information exempt for public consumption, as specified by 
national regulations governing access to documents in the public 
administration (The Public Procurement Act, 2006). 
Public sensitive II Proprietary information, as specified by national regulations 
governing the management of information in need of protection 
for other reasons than those mentioned in the national act on 
protective security services, including regulations (Protection 
Instructions, 1972). 
Business sensitive Business confidential or proprietary information, as specified by 
the individual enterprise. 
Public sensitive and 
business sensitive
Personal data, as specified by national acts regulating the 
processing of personal data (Personal Data Act, 2000). 
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Location and Description of Storage Facility 
Giving a description of the piqlVault and its surrounding environment that is accurate, 
precise and which reflects the way Piql AS envisions the implementation of the Piql 
system is an important step of risk identification, which will in turn allow us to give 
meaningful results in the analysis and evaluation phases. Of course, such a precise and 
realistic description of a piqlVault and its surroundings would vary greatly between 
countries and between sectors.
Safety and Security Requirements 
As the design and layout of the storage room used for analysis is described, it is possible 
to specify which safety and security requirements are built into the storage facility. 
The Scenario Template 
The purpose of developing a scenario template to help with the process of scenario 
description is twofold. First, it will enable thorough analysis of a greater number of 
scenarios: a risk assessment of this scale necessitates a wide range of scenarios covering 
a wide range of possible security challenges and vulnerabilities threatening the 
Preservation Services. Second, it will provide ease of use for interested parties at later 
stages. As this report is part of a larger project, it is meant to be used by the Consortium 
partners in later work packages. The template used is described in the Appendix to this 
paper. 
Presenting the Scenarios 
The scenarios analysed in the report cover 12 security situations. These 12 situations 
include chemical accidents, fire inside of the production plant, natural disasters (floods, 
forest fire, earthquake), theft with insiders involved or performed by crime organisation, 
sabotage, espionage, terrorism, armed conflict and nuclear war. These scenarios are 
fully described in the final report and detailed in the Appendix to this paper. 
Recommendations 
General recommendations on security measures are made so that the Preservation Users 
can keep the piqlFilms they store as protected as possible. However, it is important to 
remember that there is no “one size fits all” in this matter. Different geographical 
settings, market areas, sectors and level of sensitivity play important roles, so it is up to 
the individual users how to prioritize the risks uncovered by this assessment. Additional 
recommendations are then made for the Consortium partners to consider alterations to 
the Piql components, which they may decide to implement in future versions.
Recommendations for General Security
A general rule of information security is to always keep backups. One should therefore 
request more than one copy of a piqlFilm, and they should preferably be placed in 
different locations. Another general measure to employ is to preserve the information 
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using the hybrid method, i.e. both as visual text/images as well as digital. It has 
previously been stated that the piqlFilms are at their most vulnerable during 
transportation. Changing the transportation route from day to day would make it more 
difficult for a threat actor to stage an assault, but having the production site at the 
storage facility would remove the entire risk altogether.
The insider threat was highlighted as one of the biggest security challenges the Piql 
Systems faces. To mitigate this risk, one can:
 Have sound procedures like security clearance, check of criminal records, and 
credit check in place during hiring processes;
 Perform such checks at regular intervals during employment;
 Make sure only a few highly trusted people have access to the most critical parts 
of the service;
 Implement a control system where a second Piql operator needs to approve that 
a piqlFilm is withdrawn from the storage system or leaving the storage facility;
 Ensure that a person never works alone, whether they are an operator of the 
production or a security guard working the night-shift.
Recommendations for Physical Security
One event that can cause loss of ideal storage conditions is loss of utilities, most 
importantly the energy supply, but also water, gas etc. Backup generators and doubling 
of energy supply from two independent sources, e.g. electricity and diesel, is 
recommended.
In case of fire inside the building of where the piqlFilms are stored, a vast supply of 
oxygen restricting gas is important. A sprinkler system can potentially do more harm 
than the fire it is meant to put out. If the fire is outside of the building, i.e. a forest fire, 
measures needs to be taken on the construction of the building and its surroundings, 
such as clearing a safety zone between structures and vegetation, and only using fire- 
resistant or non-combustible materials on exterior surfaces. It is also a recommendation 
to add some sort of flame deterrent to the piqlBox itself, to mitigate the risk of 
damaging the piqlFilm in case of a fire.
Since there is not sufficient information to make a clear statement regarding the 
effects of water on the piqlFilm and piqlBox, the recommendation to the Consortium 
partners is to conduct tests of the piqlFilm with both clean, dirty, hot and cold water, 
with different duration of submersion. Despite this lack of information, it is still 
recommended to avoid exposure of the piqlFilm to water, to prevent the film layers 
sticking together, and the swelling and softening of the emulsion. A preventive measure 
would be to develop an air-tight, waterproof piqlBox.
How the piqlBox and piqlFilm are affected by jolts, drops, and external physical 
pressure, e.g. falling infrastructure due to an earthquake, is another subject where we 
lack sufficient information. As with the effects of water damage, we recommend that 
tests be conducted to better understand the consequences of such events. 
In the report it is described how strong oxidative chemicals, like ozone, would cause 
great damage to the piqlFilm and the piqlBox. A possible solution would be to wrap the 
piqlBox in sealed aluminium foil to ward off gasses, as well as bacteria and other 
microorganisms. This type of measure would also mitigate damages to the piqlFilm 
caused by water.
IJDC  |  General Article
336   |   Secure Data for the Future doi:10.2218/ijdc.v13i1.665
In terms of nuclear radiation and electromagnetic radiation, the report makes no 
specific recommendations. The likelihood of nuclear radiation effecting the Piql 
Preservation System is too low to make radial changes to the safety and security 
measures. If electromagnetic radiation was ever directed specifically at the Piql 
Preservation Services, the technology would be negatively affected for a time, but the 
confidentiality and integrity of the stored information would remain intact. Ultraviolet 
radiation on the other hand can affect the integrity of the information stored on piqlFilm 
quite severely. We therefore recommend to never leave the film exposed to sunlight, and 
to use appropriate lighting inside.
When it comes to physical theft and physical sabotage, the report focuses on 
ensuring a sophisticated security regime is in place in and around both production and 
storage facilities in the form of fences, camera surveillance, alarm systems and 
employed guards both during and outside of office hours.
Recommendations for Computer Security 
The report recommends that the guidelines set forth by the Norwegian National Security 
Authority to ensure the most impenetrable computer security regime, must be in place. 
These stipulate: all hardware and software must be state of the art, update security 
software as fast as possible, never distribute administrator rights to end-user, and block 
any unauthorized programs. Studies show that these four measures stop 80-90% of all 
internet related attacks. In addition, the guidelines say to activate code protection 
against unknown vulnerabilities, harden applications, utilize firewalls on client 
interfaces, use secure booting and hard disk cryptography, use anti-virus and anti- 
malware, and never to utilize more applications than strictly necessary. 
In addition, the report recommends that Piql AS should offer its users cryptography 
as part of the front-end service before information is transferred, and implement 
cryptography for protection of the information after it enters the Piql IT system. This 
would compromise the vision of being self-contained, so whether this feature should 
stay intact or not should be up to the individual user to decide.
Conclusions 
The scenario analysis identified several vulnerabilities: some severe, such as fire and the 
threat of an insider; and some not so severe, like electromagnetic pulses and nuclear 
radiation, and some that simply require more testing. The main finding in terms of 
vulnerabilities is that it is the gelatine emulsion layer of the piqlFilm that is the weakest 
link, and as this is where the information is written, this vulnerability could have grave 
consequences for the security of the information stored. However, the gelatine silver 
print method has been used to preserve photos and moving images since 1874, and 
despite imperfect storage conditions, some of the first examples still exists today. 
Nevertheless, Piql Services has many strengths. For example, the choice of 
materials, disregarding the gelatine emulsion layer, can serve to increase the security of 
the information stored. The properties of the PP (polypropilene) of the piqlBox and the 
PET (polyethylene terephthalate) of the piqlFilm seem to withstand a great deal of 
external influence.
Perhaps the most significant strength is that the piqlFilm is as an offline medium. 
With 500-year longevity, meaning no need for migration, this sets Piql Services apart 
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from any other physical storage medium for digital information. The content-data is 
only connected to online networks once, and only a handful of people must be involved. 
When it comes to physical security there are some issues in terms of forces outside 
of one’s control, be it forces of nature or threat actors with malicious intents. Taking 
necessary precautions and constantly being aware of potential risks should be sufficient. 
With time, the level of risk may be made even lower if alterations are made following 
this assessment. Ultimately, the decision to store information in any manner is a matter 
of risk acceptance. There will always be risks involved with every storage system when 
valuable information is involved. It simply a matter of placing the risk at a level 
acceptable to the user.
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Appendix 1




Scenario Justification Justification for the choice of scenario
Scenario Outline Short description of the context and events leading 
up to this scenario and the cause of the incident. 
Short description of the incident, i.e. what happens, 
and when, how and in what environment does the 
incident occur.
Cause
Type of risk (hazard/threat)
Intentional (Yes/No/Both)
Profile of actor (if intentional) Short description of the profile of an actor that is 
willing and capable to conduct event, including 
‘modus operandi’
Description of cause Threat: Motive, if it is an intentional act. Why is the 
value that the Piql Preservation Services is 
protecting valuable to this actor? (Intention). 
Hazard: Type of hazard and brief description of 
properties. Cause of the accident or natural 
disaster, if it is an unintentional event.
Competence and resources (if 
intentional)
Applicable for intentional events: Necessary level of  
competence and availability of resources 
(equipment and economical means). (Capacity). 
User/value
User class Sector
User type Market area
Value What is the value to be protected? What type of 
information? How is it valued? Why is it valuable? 
Is it irreplaceable?
Location
Location description Geographical zone, with brief description of climate  
zone (local geographical and typological 
conditions), developmental level (general standard 
of infrastructure and work culture) and political 
stability (stable borders, internal threat actors).  
City or countryside? 
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Include what is relevant for the scenario.
Environment description Local weather conditions. Time of year (with 
regards to temperature, etc.) Time of day (with 
regards to personnel on duty). Year/Time period. 
The same hazard/threat can occur many times from 
a point onwards. If the hazard/threat presupposes a 
different setting in future, then the time period 
would simply start at a later point in the future and 
onwards.
Vault description In mountain or in building. If in building: in 
basement, lower or upper floor? Inside 
environment.
Local safety measures Fortified walls, seismic resistance, fire protection, 
water protection, radiation protection, EMP 
protection, utility backup. 
Local security measures Physical security measures on access control, 
camera surveillance, alarm systems and sensors, 
and number of personnel.
Consequences
Outer building Damages on physical infrastructure of building or 
mountain facility. 
Vault Security challenges/vulnerabilities for vault. 
Box Security challenges/vulnerabilities for box.
Film Security challenges/vulnerabilities for film. 
Power/energy supply How was the power supply affected? 
Divergence from ISO standard Specified deviations from ISO standard in the vault 
concerning temperature and relative humidity, and 
the time duration of the divergence. 
Security mechanisms
Integrity Brief summary on effects on integrity 
Availability Brief summary on effects on availability. 
Confidentiality Brief summary on effects on confidentiality. 
Immunity Brief summary on effects on immunity (against 
attacks on CIA). 
Recommendations
Recommended protective measures List the safety or security measures which could 
alleviate the consequences of the scenario. 
References Relevant literature
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Appendix 2: Detailed  Scenarios
Scenario 1: An accident at a nearby chemical plant caused by a human error
Chlorine gas is released into the humid atmosphere. The piqlBox and piqlFilm are 
subjected to prolonged exposure. The piqlFilms that the gas reaches are corroded, 
especially the gelatine emulsion where the information is written. This severely affects 
integrity and availability, as the data is destroyed and is thus no longer readable or 
accessible. However, neither is the data readable to anybody else anymore, so at least 
confidentiality is left intact.
Scenario 2: A technical error causing sparks to ignite in the electrical system which 
powers the piqlVault system
This error causes the system to malfunction and shut down, as the faulty wires cannot 
direct electricity generated by the backup generator either. The sparks cause an 
electrical fire at the charging stations at the top of the grid which spreads. The fire sets 
of the sprinkler system in the building, helping to control the flames, but also dousing 
the piqlBoxes and –Films in water. More water is added once the fire department 
arrives. The piqlBoxes and piqlFilms near the top of the grid that are touched by the 
flames are damaged beyond repair because they quickly start to melt. The piqlFilms 
doused in too much water by the fire hoses and the ones near the bottom of the grid 
where water starts rising may be damaged because the piqlBoxes are not water-proof. 
The incident does not affect the confidentiality of the information on the films, yet 
availability and integrity are compromised temporarily or irrevocably for the piqlFilms 
too badly damaged either by fire or water. Some may be saved with the proper 
treatment. 
Scenario 3: A natural disaster in the form of an extreme flood during rainy season 
made worse by the effects of climate change
Due to the placement of the piqlVault in the basement, the raging waters quickly fill the 
entire space and completely submerge all the piqlFilms in the vault in extremely filthy 
water for days. Although the piqlVault system grid remains upright and the piqlFilms 
are kept in their original position inside the piqlBoxes, the boxes are not waterproof and 
filthy water can seep in and immerse the piqlFilms. The severity of the flood means that 
access to the piqlFilms is impossible for several days and they are all destroyed (we 
assume, but testing is necessary). The confidentiality of the information on the 
piqlFilms remains intact, as no one without authorized access would be able to read it 
during the incident. Neither, however, would the data owner. Because the piqlFilms are 
assumed to be destroyed, the integrity of the information, as well as the availability, is 
compromised. 
Scenario 4: An alternative natural disaster, e.g. a forest fire, which is made larger 
and more violent by the effects of climate change
After a period of excessive heat and drought, the piqlVault, which is placed in the lower 
floors of a building situated in the urban/rural interface, is caught in a fierce forest fire. 
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The local fire department are unable to get control of the fire for some time and it can 
rage in the vicinity for a fortnight. Not only are many of the piqlFilms and piqlBoxes 
irreparably damaged by the fire, but the data owner is also unable to gain access to the 
building for a very long time due to the dangers of the forest fire reaching the building 
again. Availability is thus compromised for all the films for a fortnight, and forever for 
the ones which were destroyed by the fire. The same is true for the integrity of these 
films, whereas confidentiality is only threatened but not compromised. However, as the 
piqlVault was equipped with a highly effective fire suppression mechanism, many of the 
piqlFilms, which would have been destroyed by the fire, were saved. 
Scenario 5: An earthquake measuring 7.5 on the Richter scale hits the city where a 
piqlVault is located during the middle of an intense heat wave
The skyscraper, in which the piqlVault is situated in one of the top floors, remains 
standing, but its infrastructure is badly damaged, leaving the piqlFilms in the vault 
exposed to the elements and allowing warm humid air to flow freely into the vault. The 
water pipes around the storage room burst, soaking the piqlFilms in water, and the 
electrical system is also damaged, which means that the ventilation system fails. Pieces 
of concrete fall from the broken ceiling onto some of the piqlBoxes. The integrity and 
availability of the piqlFilms which are struck by the pieces of concrete is irrevocably 
compromised. If the piqlFilms which are exposed to the water from the ruined pipes is 
not dried and handled correctly, their integrity and availability may be compromised as 
well. For the remaining PiqlFilms, the integrity and availability may be compromised if 
they are left too long exposed to high levels of temperature and humidity, as this affects 
the readability of the information. Confidentiality is threatened, as the security 
parameters surrounding the piqlVault are no longer in place, but the instability of the 
building’s structure means that no one can enter anyway. 
Scenario 6: The theft of sensitive piqlFilms committed with the help of an insider
In a future setting where tougher market competition necessitates more brutal means of 
getting ahead, the oil company X bribes a high-level employee with complete access to 
the EWMS in the piqlVault system, who manages to leave the facility with the relevant 
piqlFilms without being stopped. The piqlFilms contain information on a new method to 
do oil well analysis, which can make dry oil wells profitable again. Though the 
transaction is logged, and the culprit is caught, the damage has already been done 
because the trade secrets, and thus also market shares, have already been lost. Although 
the integrity of the information was not tampered with, its availability to the data owner 
was compromised and, more importantly, so was its confidentiality. 
Scenario 7: The theft of sensitive information committed by an actor in an 
organized crime syndicate 
A threat actor with access to heavy firepower commits a criminal act that takes place 
while the piqlFilms are transported from the production site to the storage facility. As 
part of a scheme to expand their revenue, the crime network decides to accept a job 
from a third party to steal piqlFilms storing personal data which is to be used in large 
scale identity theft. Although the sensitive information is protected by additional 
security during transportation, it is not enough to stop a gang of four persons from 
robbing the truck at gun point, forcing the security personnel accompanying the 
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piqlFilms to give them up on pain of death. The integrity of the information remains 
intact, but the availability to the data owner is lost. The confidentiality of the 
information is most definitely compromised, at the cost of all the people who now stand 
to have their identities misused. 
Secenario 8: Sabotage
Sabotage is a very relevant threat to the Piql Services. State X hackers can perform 
logical sabotage on the client information which is being prepared for writing. The 
hackers place malware in the system which utilizes the interconnection between the Piql 
computer and the Piql I/O computer to create an open connection between the two. As 
the hackers now have free access to both computers’ CPUs (Central Processing Unit) 
they can alter the client data undetected because they also change the corresponding 
checksum on both CPUs. Even though the Piql I/O computer does what it is supposed 
toand checks the integrity of the data against the designated checksum, it can find no 
faults and confirms the data ready for writing on the piqlFilm. The integrity of the 
information is highly compromised, as is the availability of the altered pieces of 
information. The confidentiality is compromised as well. 
Scenario 9: Espionage
Depending on the level of sensitivity of the information which is stored on the piqlFilm, 
the Piql System can be a target of espionage. This scenario underlines the risks involved 
when the digital data is processed during production before it is written onto the 
piqlFilm. Spyware is installed on this computer when the Piql system is used by the US 
military. The State X, as we will call them, manages to install spyware on the Piql 
computer system which the security measures in place are unable to detect. As a result, 
State X gains access to the designs of a weapon system developed by State Y, the major 
military power in the world. The spyware does no harm to the information: it simply 
copies the data that is located on the computer and sends it undetected to State X. 
Neither the integrity nor the availability of the information is affected, yet the 
confidentiality of highly sensitive information which can severely affect the relationship 
between two parties is lost. 
Scenario 10: Terrorism
A piqlVault is in the same building as a major NGO advocating multiculturalism. One 
day, without warning, a lone right wing extremist places a car bomb in front of the 
building and offices of said NGO and remote detonates the bomb. The Piql System 
becomes collateral damage. The bomb is powerful enough to cause severe damage to 
the structural integrity of the building, but the building does not collapse. Additionally, 
though the piqlVault is placed on the ground floor, it is placed on the opposite side of 
the building to where the bomb is placed, meaning that the damage to the vault is not as 
severe as the front offices. However, the bomb was powerful enough to cause great 
damage to the piqlVault. The damage to the building was to such an extent that the 
temperature and humidity regulation in the vault can no longer be upheld and the films 
are exposed to the elements. The integrity of some of the films is compromised, as they 
were damaged by the falling infrastructure caused by the bomb. The rest of the films are 
damaged only insofar as the cold of the outside air has a noteworthy effect on them. 
IJDC  |  General Article
doi:10.2218/ijdc.v13i1.665 Bendik Bryde and Roberto Gonzalez   |   343
Availability is likewise compromised, whereas confidentiality is only threatened but not 
compromised. 
Scenario 11: Armed conflict with strategic assault as part of the build-up to a 
larger confrontation
In a future setting where a state actor has set world domination as its goal, the threat 
actor executes a strategic assault on Svalbard, as it needs to remove what it believes to 
be intelligence about the state actor’s military capacity. This is a step in a larger scheme 
to attack Europe, which the state actor believes it cannot do if European powers possess 
this information about them. Electromagnetic weapons (EMWs) and explosives are used 
to gain access to the storage facility, which is placed in a mountain repository. The 
electromagnetic pulses and controlled explosions do no harm to the piqlFilms, but they 
enable the unauthorized access of the state actor to the information, which is 
subsequently removed from the piqlVault. For a short period of time, the ideal storage 
conditions are not present in the piqlVault, but this is quickly rectified. The integrity of 
all the piqlFilms in the vault remains intact, but the availability and the confidently of 
the stolen piqlFilms is lost. 
Scenario 12: Nuclear war
In a future setting, the days of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) are back, yet the 
playing field is different than it was during the Cold War. There are a greater number of 
active nuclear powers, all with deterrence as their main policy, which means that the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is higher, and more areas of the world are directly 
exposed to the threat. Many warheads are directed at various major cities always. One 
such city is a major metropolis in the Middle East. A glitch in the launch system of a 
major nuclear power releases a missile on said city by mistake. Even though the 
piqlVault is not situated within the radius of ground zero where heavily built concrete 
structures are severely damaged and fatalities approach 100%, it is still within the air 
blast and thermal radiation radius where most residential houses collapse, and fatalities 
are widespread. The piqlVault with all its piqlFilms is, in other words, a casualty of war. 
As all the piqlFilms are annihilated in the explosion, the integrity and availability of the 
information is forever lost, whereas the confidentiality remains intact.
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